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INTRODUCTION
In early 2014 Quentin Tarantino publicly stated that his unproduced script The Hateful Eight was leaked and he would no longer
be making the movie.1 On January 22, 2014, Gawker Media
(“Gawker”), an Internet media outlet specializing in pop culture
news, published a post reporting the leak’s occurrence and Tarantino’s subsequent reaction on its Defamer blog.2 At the end of the
post, Gawker solicited readers for access to the script.3 The next
day, Gawker posted a follow-up titled, “Here Is the Leaked Quentin Tarantino Hateful Eight Script,” with several hyperlinks, three
of which directed readers to one of two websites hosting anonymously posted, unauthorized copies of Tarantino’s leaked script.4
Gawker encouraged readers to click on the hyperlinks in order to
read the script but did not otherwise ask its readers to copy or distribute the leaked scripts.5
On January 27, 2014, Tarantino filed a complaint against
Gawker in the Western Division of the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, alleging that Gawker
contributorily infringed Tarantino’s copyright.6 The complaint alleged that Tarantino’s camp filed two Digital Millennium Copy1

Mike Fleming Jr., Quentin Tarantino Shelves ‘The Hateful Eight’ After Betrayal
Results in Script Leak, DEADLINE (Jan. 21, 2014, 5:40 PM), http://deadline.com/2014/01/
quentin-tarantino-hateful-eight-leak-novel-669066/. At the time of the interview, the leak
was presumably not publicly posted to the Internet. See also Eriq Gardner, Quentin
Tarantino Suing Gawker Over Leaked ‘Hateful Eight’ Script (Exclusive), THE HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER (Jan. 27, 2014, 8:03 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/
quentin-tarantino-suing-gawker-leaked-674424.
2
Lacey Donohue, Quentin Tarantino Throws Temper Tantrum After Script Leak,
DEFAMER (Jan. 22, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://defamer.gawker.com/quentin-tarantinothrows-temper-tantrum-after-script-le-1506541036.
3
Id.
4
Lacey Donohue, Here Is the Leaked Quentin Tarantino Hateful Eight Script,
DEFAMER (Jan. 23, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://defamer.gawker.com/here-are-plot-detailsfrom-quentin-tarantinos- leaked-1507675261. The web pages hosting the leak script that
the hyperlinks led to have since been disabled.
5
Id.; Tarantino v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. CV 14-603-JFW FFMX, 2014 WL
2434647, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2014) (order granting motion to dismiss).
6
Complaint, Tarantino, No. 2:14CV00603 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014), 2014 WL
279854. In the same suit, Tarantino also sued AnonFiles.com, the website hosting the
unauthorized copy, and nine other anonymous defendants for direct infringement.
Tarantino did not know the identities of any of these parties. See id. at 1–10 (naming ten
“DOE” defendants).
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right Act (“DMCA”) takedown notices of infringement to Gawker, requesting removal of the hyperlinks.7 The media site refused to
comply with the takedown notice and did not remove the hyperlinks.8
Gawker moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Tarantino’s
complaint did not allege that a third party had directly infringed
Tarantino’s copyright, a crucial element for proving contributory
copyright infringement.9 Gawker continued that, even if he did
prove a third party’s direct infringement, their hyperlinks were
part of a news report constituting fair use under the Copyright Act
of 1976 (“Copyright Act”).10 The judge agreed, granting Gawker’s
motion to dismiss but allowing Tarantino to file an amended complaint alleging contributory infringement.11 The judge declined to
evaluate Gawker’s fair use defense because it felt the argument was
“premature,” but hinted that it would ultimately prevail.12
Tarantino filed an amended lawsuit, this time claiming Gawker
both contributorily and directly infringed his copyright by posting
hyperlinks to unauthorized copies of his script.13 Tarantino also
made sure to specifically allege that at least one anonymous person
downloaded the script after clicking Gawker’s hyperlink, but did

7

Id. at 11–12.
Id.
9
Motion to Dismiss at 1, Tarantino, No. 2:14-cv-00603-JFW-FFM (C.D. Cal. Mar.
10, 2014), 2014 WL 1356498; see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146,
1173 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Tarantino, No. CV 14-603-JFW FFMX, 2014 WL 2434647,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2014) (order granting motion to dismiss) (“However, nowhere
in . . . the Complaint does [Tarantino] allege a single act of direct infringement committed
by any member of the general public that would support [Tarantino]’s claim for
contributory copyright infringement. Instead, [Tarantino] merely speculates that some
direct infringement must have taken place.”).
10
Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, Tarantino, No. 2:14-cv-00603-JFW-FFM (C.D. Cal. Mar.
10, 2014), 2014 WL 1356498; Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
11
See Tarantino, No. CV 14-603-JFW FFMX, 2014 WL 2434647, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 22, 2014) (order granting motion to dismiss) (“[T]he Court concludes that the fair
use arguments, albeit persuasive and potentially dispositive, are premature . . .”).
12
Id. at *5 (“However, the Court concludes that the fair use arguments, albeit
persuasive and potentially dispositive, are premature . . . .”).
13
First Amended Complaint at 10, Tarantino, No. 2:14-cv-00603-JFW-FFM (C.D.
Cal. May 1, 2014), 2014 WL 2526689. Tarantino also dropped AnonFiles.com and the
other anonymous defendants from the suit. See id.
8
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not offer any concrete factual support.14 Before Gawker could respond to the amended complaint, Tarantino filed a notice for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.15 The notice reserves Tarantino’s right to re-file an action against Gawker for contributory infringement “after further investigations to ascertain and plead the
identities of additional infringers resulting from Gawker Media’s
contributory copyright infringement.”16
Though Tarantino v. Gawker will likely never see the light of
day, the question of whether Gawker, as a news website, would be
held contributorily liable for knowingly posting hyperlinks to a copyright-infringing website, is an interesting one. This issue is particularly thorny because both hyperlinks as they pertain to copyright
law and contributory copyright infringement are amorphous areas
of law.17 It also raises issues of fair use, both in the hyperlinking
context and in the news story context.
Part I of this Note provides background for hyperlinking, copyright law, fair use, and contributory infringement. Part II of this
Note discusses pertinent hyperlinking, copyright infringement, and
fair use cases. Part III of this Note argues that Gawker should be
held liable in the instant case if Meghan Carpenter’s and Stephen
Hetcher’s proposition that the fixation requirement’s “transitory
duration” prong should be shed from the inquiry altogether. It also
argues that Gawker’s use of the hyperlinks in this case should not
constitute fair use.

14
See id. at 8 (naming “Doe-Downloader(s) 3 through 6” and stating that each
“download[ed] a copy” of the script).
15
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 2, Tarantino, No. 2:14-cv-00603-JFW-FFM (C.D.
Cal. May 7, 2014), available at http://www.shadesofgraylaw.com/media/Tarantino-vGawker-Notice-of-Vol-Withdrawal.pdf; see also Gardner, supra note 1. Tarantino decided
to continue with filming The Hateful Eight soon after his voluntary withdrawal. See Roger
Friedman, Exclusive: Tarantino Move ‘Hateful Eight’ Has a November Start Date,
SHOWBIZ411 (May 24, 2014, 10:26 AM), http://www.showbiz411.com/2014/05/24/
exclusive-tarantino-movie-hateful-eight-has-november-start-date.
16
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 2, Tarantino, No. 2:14-cv-00603-JFW-FFM (C.D.
Cal. May 7, 2014), available at http://www.shadesofgraylaw.com/media/Tarantino-vGawker-Notice-of-Vol-Withdrawal.pdf.
17
RICHARD RAYSMAN, ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW: FORMS AND
ANALYSIS § 5.25 (2014).
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I. BACKGROUND ON HYPERLINKING, CONTRIBUTORY
INFRINGEMENT, AND FAIR USE
Emerging technologies tend to throw a wrench into prevailing
theories underlying copyright protections.18 The advent of the digital and Internet age is no exception to this trend.19 The Internet’s
greatness derives from its unparalleled ability to swiftly, cheaply,
and simultaneously connect people across the globe via information
exchange, provided those people have access to the necessary
technological means.20 These treasured benefits present a sort of
Jekyll and Hyde complex for copyright holders.21 On one hand,
cheap and direct dissemination of works to a substantially wider
audience at a substantially lower cost aids in boosting recognition
and profitability, which should theoretically incentivize copyright
holders to create more works.22 Furthermore, increased dissemination and access to works inspires a new crop of artists.23 To see this
in action, one needs to only spend a few minutes browsing the millions of Tumblr accounts, iTunes podcasts, and YouTube videos,
which host a rich environment of original and derivative works.
On the other hand, those same features significantly reduce the
cost and increase the ease of piracy, which incentivizes more
people to commit copyright infringement.24 These effects are so
acute that they compound; theoretically there are so many people
18

See Brian D. Johnston, Rethinking Copyright’s Treatment of New Technology: Strategic
Obsolescence as a Catalyst for Interest Group Compromise, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
165, 166 (2008) (“Each time a major technological innovation has emerged, the law of
copyright has had to address the new types of reproduction and dissemination that
innovation facilitates.”); see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22 (2006)
(“Copyright laws become obsolete when technology renders the assumptions on which
they were based outmoded.”).
19
See Johnston, supra note 18, at 167.
20
See DanThu Thi Phan, Note, Will Fair Use Function on the Internet?, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 169, 187–89 (1998).
21
See id. at 169.
22
See Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Economics of Copyright and the Internet: Moving to an
Empirical Assessment Relevant in the Digital Age (World Intellectual Prop. Org. Econ.
Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 9, 2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/
econ_stat/en/economics/pdf/wp9.pdf.
23
See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT: ARTS
ORGANIZATIONS AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.pewinternet
.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_ArtsandTechnology_PDF.pdf.
24
Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 22.
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who will now pirate works that it becomes too costly to effectively
police, thus further reducing costs of committing infringement.25
A. What is Hyperlinking?
It is important to understand the technical background for how
links work. Many courts have utilized the nitty-gritty details to fuel
a doctrinal vehicle in order to reach policy goals.26 Interestingly,
although some courts focus on the technical aspects of linking to
distinguish cases and reach a doctrinal conclusion, all types of links
themselves are fundamentally the same.27
The Internet is an electronic network comprised of computing
devices, or “servers.”28 Its central purposes are to facilitate communication and the exchange of information across the globe.29
The World Wide Web is an application for the Internet that allows
users to achieve that goal.30 Users view the content on the World
Wide Web via web pages, each of which has its own Uniform Resource Locater (“URL”).31 URLs are similar to addresses in that a
URL tells the application exactly where the web page is.32 A web
page is stored on a website, which in turn is stored on the servers.33
One analogy for the relationship between a website and a web page
is that the former is a book and the latter is an individual page within that book. A homepage, which is a type of web page, is the book
cover.

25

See id.
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007);
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000 WL
525390 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000).
27
World Wide Web Consortium, “Deep Linking” in the World Wide Web: TAG Finding
11 Sep 2003, http://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/deeplinking-20030911 (Sept. 11, 2003)
(“Thus, from the point of view of the underlying technology, all links are deep links.”).
28
Kai Burmeister, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, Copyright, and the Internet: Protection
Against Framing in an International Setting, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
625, 629 (1999).
29
See id.
30
See Tim Berners-Lee et al., The World-Wide Web, 37 COMM. ACM 76, 76 (1994).
31
See id. A URL is alternatively known as a Universal Resource Identifier (“URI”).
See id.
32
See id.
33
Resonate Inc. v. Alteon Websystems, Inc., 338. F.3d 1360, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
26
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A hyperlink—or “link”—is a “connection from one [World
Wide] Web resource to another.”34 In more visual terms, a link is a
“cross-reference (in a distinctive font or color) appearing on one
web page that, when activated by the point-and-click of a mouse,
brings onto the computer screen another web page.”35 Hyperlinks
are an essential tool for navigating the Internet, allowing users to
move fluidly between web pages and maximizing the Internet’s
vast information-sharing potential. Simply put, the Internet could
not be what it is today without hyperlinks.36
There are several different types of links.37 This Note concerns
only links that, when clicked on, open up new third-party web pages hosting infringing content.38 This includes links taking you directly to the homepage of another website and deep links, where
the link directs you to any page other than a website’s homepage.39
It used to be considered poor Internet etiquette to deep link to
another website because it would cause users to bypass vital information and advertising on the homepage. However, this distinction’s significance has dwindled since most website owners have
adapted to the pervasive practice of deep linking and design web
pages accordingly.
B. The Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution
granted Congress the authority to pass legislation that would
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
34

World Wide Web Consortium, HTML 4.01 Specification: W3C Recommendation 24
December 1999, Links, http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/struct/links.html (Dec. 24,
1999) [hereinafter Links].
35
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 455 (2d Cir. 2001).
36
See generally Links, supra note 34.
37
See Mark Deffner, Note, Unlawful Linking: First Amendment Doctrinal Difficulties in
Cyberspace, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 111, 116–17 (2002) (discussing basic links, a
linking called framing, deep linking, and inlining).
38
As opposed to, for example, in-line links, which display content from a third-party
website within the web page the user is already on. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In-line linking allows one to import a graphic from a
source website and incorporate it in one’s own website . . .”).
39
A homepage is “the page typically encountered first on a Web site that usually
contains links to the other pages of the site.” Home Page Definition, MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/home%20page (last visited
Oct. 20, 2014).
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limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”40 Congress passed its first
copyright law in 1790, which has since undergone major revisions,
including two overhauls in 1909 and 1976, and multiple amendments.41 The 1790 Act only protected “maps, charts, and books.”42
The 1909 Act expanded this protection to “all the writings of an
author” and added a formal publication requirement on works in
order to receive protection.43 The contemporary copyright statute,
the Copyright Act of 1976, eliminated the publication requirement
and expanded protection again to protect eight categories of works,
which are to be broadly interpreted.44
The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclusive rights
on reproduction, distribution, creation of derivative works, public
performance, and, for sound recordings, public display over “digital audio transmission.”45 Copyright law is only designed to protect
the original expression of ideas, but not the ideas themselves.46
Thus, facts are not protectable under copyright.47
40

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575
(1994).
41
Many of these revisions expanded the scope of U.S. copyright law to accommodate
new technology and protect works not previously contemplated by the law. See 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT Overview (1993)
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]; Timothy D. Howell, Intellectual Property Pirates:
Congress Raises the Stakes in the Modern Battle to Protect Copyrights and Safeguard the
United States Economy, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 613, 627–28 (1996).
42
See Howell, supra note 41, at 627.
43
See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076.
44
The eighth category was added by amendment in 1990. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(“Works of authorship include . . . (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works.”); Howell, supra note 41, at 628 n.45 (“The categories of copyrightable subject
matter listed in 102 are not all-inclusive and Congress clearly intended for them to be read
broadly.”).
45
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
46
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea . . . .”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217
(1954) (stating that copyright “protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not
the idea itself.”); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
47
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (“That there
can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.”); Harper & Row Publishers,
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One is liable for direct copyright infringement when one “violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.”48 An alleged infringer need not copy the entire work verbatim to be liable
for direct infringement; liability partially turns on whether the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the original work.49
In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme
Court held that the heart of copyright law is essentially the plain
language of the Copyright Clause and not to compensate authors
for their hard work.50 However, the Copyright Clause itself provides a limited touchstone for predicting future copyright doctrine,
primarily because there is no precise, authoritative definition of
what “promotes” advancement of these fields.51 Moreover, even
though rewarding authors’ labors is not the end goal of copyright
law, Congress may still declare it to be an effective policy to
achieve that goal.52
The Copyright Act of 1976 protects creative “works of authorship” that are “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”53
Thus, a work must satisfy two elements to be eligible for copyright
protection: originality and fixation. The originality element is a

Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (“No author may copyright his ideas or
the facts he narrates.”).
48
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006).
49
See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, § 13.03. Thus, it is possible to copy a
work and not be held liable for copyright infringement. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361 (“Not all
copying, however, is copyright infringement.”).
50
See Feist 499 U.S. at 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labors of authors.”).
51
See generally Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining
“Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing
the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001) (arguing for a need of a precise definition
of “progress” since Congress, the Supreme Court, and academic literature have not
provided one).
52
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212–13 (2003) (“[I]t is generally for Congress,
not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”); Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 209 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors.”).
53
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
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constitutional requirement and “the sine qua non of copyright.”54
The threshold for originality is resolutely minimal; all that is required is independent creation and a modicum of creativity.55 Originality under copyright law does not even require novelty.56 This
Note does not concern issues of originality, as it assumes the web
page is infringing an author’s legitimate copyright.
Under the Copyright Act, a work satisfies the fixation requirement “when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than a transitory duration.”57
Courts have held fixation to be a constitutional requirement, deriving fixation implicitly from “[w]ritings” in the Copyright Clause.58
Fixation was only “de facto, if not incidental” part of copyright law
until it was codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.59 Prior to 1976
and the invention of electronic media, nearly all authored works
were written down and thus immediately fixed, obviating the need
for a formal fixation requirement.60 Indeed, before the fixation requirement was codified, Congress considered eliminating the de
facto fixation requirement in the interest of protecting authors’
works.61 Ultimately, Congress decided to remove the publication
requirement in favor of protection upon creation, provided the originality and fixation requirements are met, because it provided a
convenient way for them to expand copyright protection to new
technologies.62
The fixation requirement is more difficult to apply to contemporary technology and art, which do not always fit the “transitory
duration” prong of fixation. Meghan Carpenter and Stephen
Hetcher argue that, in light of emerging technologies, the transito54

Feist, 499 U.S. at 346, 348.
Id. at 345.
56
Id. at 345–46 (“To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other,
compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence,
copyrightable.”).
57
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
58
See Megan Carpenter & Steven Hetcher, Function Over Form: Bringing the Fixation
Requirement into the Modern Era, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221, 2236 (2014).
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
See id. at 2237.
62
See id. at 2237–38.
55
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ry duration prong is not necessary to service the purposes of the
fixation requirement.63 The fixation requirement is vital to properly
serve the goals of the Copyright Clause because it limits the originality requirement’s “capaciousness,” thus balancing copyright
holders’ rights with the public’s interest in creative works.64 However, they assert that the transitory duration prong is a misguided
attempt in applying the purpose of the fixation requirement.65 The
Copyright Act defines copies as “material objects . . . in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device . . .”66 As Carpenter and Hetcher assert, “[i]f the transitory
duration exclusion is removed, the parameters of a work would be
defined according to its ‘embodiment,’” which is “sufficiently
permanent” under the definition of “copies” under the Copyright
Act and consistent with early fixation case law.67 Carpenter and
Hetcher also argue that the transitory duration prong cannot be
satisfactorily applied to digital technology, as evidenced by the confusion in recent case law.68 Opinions are becoming more flexible in
accepting what is fixed for the purposes of copyright law, but the
evident confusion is starting to cast doubt on the necessity of the
transitory prong.69
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) amended
the Copyright Act in 1998 in an effort to bring copyright law up to
speed with the digital age.70 As personal computers and the Internet became widely available, more copyrighted material was up63

See id. at 2226.
See id. at 2238–41.
65
See id.
66
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
67
See Carpenter & Hetcher, supra note 58, at 2248–49.
68
See id. at 2252–55.
69
See id.
70
The driving force behind congressional efforts to reform copyright law for the digital
age was trying to comply with U.S. treaty obligations after it signed the 1996 WIPO
Copyright Treaty. Diane M. Barker, Defining the Contours of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act: The Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 47, 47–49 (2005).
64
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loaded onto the web and a drastic increase in digital piracy followed
soon after.71 Copyright holders and the Internet service providers
(“ISPs”) pressured Washington to adopt new copyright laws in
order to protect their interests in the unfamiliar terrain.72 Copyright holders wanted increased protections for their digitized content while ISPs fretted over the possibility of being held liable for
every single infringement on the Internet by a third-party user.73
This prompted the Clinton administration to zero in on researching
and shaping a possible future for the Internet, particularly in relation to intellectual property and free speech concerns.74 Addressing
the concerns of copyright holders, a task force assembled in 1995 by
the Clinton administration endorsed several major changes to the
Copyright Act, but congressional attempts to codify those proposals failed.75 Congress did not resurrect the issue until after the 1996
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) conference
and the entailing U.S. treaty obligations.76 By 1997, the Clinton
administration officially endorsed a governmental policy of limited
liability for ISPs in order to promote growth, electronic trade, and
innovation.77 In 1998, President Clinton signed the DMCA into
law.78
Title II of the DMCA, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitations Act (“OCILLA”), was drafted to “clarif[y] the
liability faced by service providers who transmit potentially infringing material over their networks.”79 Legislators were nervous about
applying existing copyright doctrines to an unfamiliar arena where
they wanted to promote innovation. Thus, “[r]ather than embarking upon a wholesale clarification” of various copyright doctrines,
71

Id. at 47–48.
Id.
73
Id.
74
See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 648 (2014).
75
See Barker, supra note 70, at 49.
76
See id.
77
See WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/
Commerce/read.html (“Existing laws and regulations that may hinder electronic
commerce should be reviewed and revised or eliminated to reflect the needs of the new
electronic age.”).
78
Barker, supra note 70, at 49.
79
S. REP. NO. 105–90, at 2 (1998).
72
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Congress elected “to leave current law in its evolving state and,
instead, to create a series of ‘safe harbors,’ for certain common activities of service providers.”80 These safe harbors, coded in
§ 512(a)-(d), limited the ability of ISPs to be held liable for copyright infringement. The theory is that, unless ISPs were generally
protected from copyright infringement liability, the threat of litigation would discourage them from developing and providing beneficial online services. A case involving hyperlinking would normally
be eligible for the § 512(d) safe harbor provision.81 However, this
Note only considers media sites that knowingly hyperlink to an infringing website, jettisoning the safe harbor defense which requires
that the defendant have no “actual knowledge” of the infringing
content.82
D. Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine is a statutory affirmative defense to allegations of copyright infringement, allowing an author to use copyrighted works without consent in order to create new works, as
long as the use meets certain criteria.83 Initially a judge-made rule,
it was later adopted by Congress as Section 107 of the Copyright
Act of 1976.84 The policy goal behind this doctrine is to balance the
twin aims of protecting copyright holders’ rights and developing
“new ideas that build on earlier ones” so that Congress may ultimately “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .” 85

80

Id. at 19.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 12 (1998), available at http://copyright.gov/legislation/
dmca.pdf (“Section 512(d) relates to hyperlinks, online directories, search engines and
the like.”).
82
Id. at 12–13.
83
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The fair
use defense permits the use of copyrighted works without the copyright owner’s consent
under certain situations.”).
84
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, § 13.05. Congress’ adoption of fair use
“was ‘intended to restate the present [i.e. pre-1978] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. Therefore, in determining the scope and limits
of fair use, reference must be made to pre- as well as post-1978 cases.’” Id.
85
Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1163; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575
(1994).
81
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It is meant to prevent courts from rigidly enforcing copyrights at
the expense of growth and innovation.86
Section 107 purposefully does not define “fair use,” instead
providing four factors which courts are required to consider and
balance on a case-by-case basis when a defendant invokes fair use.87
The statute gives judges an incredible amount of discretion, as it
does not even delineate which factors should be given more
weight.88 A substantial—and at times confusing—body of law has
arisen around fair use, lending to the notion that outcomes are
highly fact-specific and difficult to predict using precedent.89 Conversely, some commentators assert that fair use is actually quite
predictable when considered in light of certain “policy-relevant
clusters,” rather than on the basis of the four factors.90 Ultimately,
the courts appear to effectively use policy to “weigh the strength of
the defendant’s justification for its use as that justification has been
developed under the first three factors, against the impact of that
use on the incentives of the plaintiff.”91
86

See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1163.
Id. The House Report states that Congress declined to define fair use and opted for
the four-factor test because “the endless variety of situations . . . of circumstances that
can rise” and possibility of “rapid technological change” indicate that “[b]eyond a very
broad statutory explanation of what fair use is . . . the courts must be free to adapt the
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.” H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (1976).
88
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). It is debated whether the generous judicial discretion the
fair use codification provides is beneficial. Compare Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (arguing that fair use should not be subject to
judge’s “intuitive judgments,” but rather “utilitarian premises of the copyright scheme
as a whole, to the exclusion of every other consideration”), with Lloyd Weinreb, Fair’s
Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138–39 (1990)
(“Development of the doctrine of fair use ought to proceed, therefore, not by deduction
from principle but by induction from concrete cases.”).
89
The commentators who suggest this are considering the weight given to each factor
relative to the particular case and its fair use finding. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540 (2009).
90
See, e.g., id. at 2541–42. The “policy-relevant clusters” proposed by each scholar
supporting this view differ precisely from each other but are generally of the same
character. The policy-relevant clusters that Samuelson observes are “promoting freedom
of speech and of expression, the ongoing progress of authorship, learning, access to
information, truth-telling or truth-seeking, competition, technological innovation, and
privacy and autonomy interests of users.” See id.
91
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 19782005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 621 (2008).
87
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The preamble to Section 107 enumerates six uses that are apposite for a fair use defense: criticism, comment, teaching, scholarship, research, and news reporting.92 This list is neither exhaustive
nor presumptive; it is merely supposed to provide guidance for applying the four factors.93 Accordingly, if the disputed use is found
to be one of the enumerated productive uses, then it is only one
factor in the balancing test and not dispositive for finding fair use.94
The first factor is the consideration of “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”95 This factor considers how “transformative” the disputed use is; that is, it judges
whether the disputed use “merely ‘supersede[s] the objects” of
the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”96 The Supreme Court has held
that the transformative factor is the most important determination
because it shares the closest relationship with the Copyright
Clause.97 Hence, while the transformative factor is not dispositive,
“the more transformative the new work,” the less the factors disfavoring a finding of fair use will matter in the analysis.98
The commercial vs. noncommercial consideration of the first
factor may also weigh heavily in a court’s decision of finding fair
use, depending on the finding.99 In an empirical study of how
courts apply the fair use doctrine, Barton Beebe found that generally, only a noncommercial use finding weighs heavily into the out-

92

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985).
94
Id.
95
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
96
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing Folsom v. March, 9
F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901); Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990)).
97
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he goal of copyright, to promote the science and
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”).
98
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not absolutely
necessary for a finding of fair use . . . the more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use.”).
99
See Beebe, supra note 91, at 602–03.
93
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come of the inquiry.100 In other words, a noncommercial use finding usually significantly influenced an outcome of finding fair use,
while a commercial use finding did not have a substantial impact on
a particular finding one way or the other.101 Curiously, this empirical finding contrasts with Supreme Court precedent.102 In Sony v.
Universal Studios, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that using
Sony’s pioneering Betamax video recording technology to record
an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted television broadcast for later
viewing was fair use.103 In finding this, the Court also held that a
determination of commercial use was presumptive of a likelihood
of market harm under the fourth factor.104 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, where fair use was found for a 2 Live Crew parody of Roy
Orbison’s song, “Pretty Woman,” the Court backtracked on its
strong position in Sony, holding that a finding of commercial use
only tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.105 Thus, although
precedent says the commercial use question is not a presumptive
factor anymore, some courts still treat it as such when they find the
use is noncommercial.106
The second factor is the “nature of the copyrighted work,”
which places more importance on the protection of fictional works
and soon-to-be-published works than factual works and published
works.107 Generally, this factor is considered the least important of
the fair use factors, although there are a few cases in which it
weighed heavily in a court’s decision.108 Interestingly, though
100

See id.
See id.
102
See id. at 598–603.
103
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
104
Id.
105
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994).
106
See Beebe, supra note 91, at 602–03.
107
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006); see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (“This factor calls for the
recognition that [fictional and soon-to-be-published] works are closer to the core of
intended copyright protection than [factual and published works], with the consequence
that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.”).
108
See Beebe, supra note 91, at 611; see, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (saying the fact that a work is unpublished is a “critical
element of its ‘nature’” in “ordinary circumstances” but is not “determinative”);
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
890 (1988) (finding that the inclusion of Salinger’s private, unpublished letters in a
biography were unlikely to constitute fair use).
101
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prominent cases such as Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises and Salinger v. Random House have held that the unpublished
factor weighed heavily in finding no fair use, Beebe’s empirical
analysis found that in most lower court cases an unpublished factor
mostly came with a finding of fair use.109
The third factor is “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”110 Courts
must measure this factor both quantitatively and qualitatively.111
Generally, the more quantitatively and qualitatively the unauthorized use takes from the original work, the less likely the chances a
court will find fair use.112 However, an unauthorized use that quantitatively copies most—or even all—of the original work will not
necessarily result in a dismissal of the fair use defense if the unauthorized use is qualitatively different enough.113 As a result of his
empirical analysis, Beebe posits that the third factor has a meaningful impact on the outcome of the fourth factor, which he argues is
“a kind of metafactor under which courts synthesize their analyses
of the first three factors.”114
The fourth and final factor is “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”115 This factor is regarded as one of the most important of the fair use factors.116 Unlike the other three factors, no distinct subfactors have
109

See Beebe, supra note 91, at 613. Beebe believes this empirical finding is a good thing,
because it furthers the ultimate goal of the Copyright Clause to disseminate creative
works, assuming the works were not soon-to-be-published works. See id. at 614.
110
17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
111
Beebe, supra note 91, at 615.
112
See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, § 13.05.
113
See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003); 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, § 13.05.
114
See Beebe, supra note 91, at 616.
115
17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
116
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (dictum)
(“[The fourth factor] is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”); see
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, § 13.05 (“If one looks to the fair use cases, if not
always to their stated rationale, [the fourth factor] emerges as the most important, and
indeed central fair use factor.”); Beebe, supra note 91, at 616–17 (finding that, though the
Campbell Court dicta may have tried to scale back the Harper & Row dictum in stating that
the four fair use factors are to be considered and weighed together, empirically the fourth
factor is the most influential factor. Beebe’s empirical analysis supports this finding:
“[O]f 141 of the opinions that found that factor four disfavored fair use, 140 found no fair
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emerged under the fourth factor, which Beebe posits as evidence of
its dispositive quality.117 The Court has tried to refine this factor
somewhat.118 In Sony and Campbell, the Court said that it requires
the consideration of “not only the extent of the market harm
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also
‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged
in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the original.”119 However,
Beebe’s findings suggest that while some of the lower courts may
still cite this “slippery slope principle . . . there was no significant
relation at any time between a court’s citing to the slippery slope
principle and its finding of no fair use.”120
E. Contributory Copyright Infringement & Inducement
Contributory copyright infringement is a branch of secondary
liability as applied to copyright law—a common law concept born
out of tort law and judicial interpretations of the Copyright Act.121
A contributory infringer is one “who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another.”122 In simpler terms, one may be
liable for contributory infringement if one knowingly causes another to infringe.123 The invocation of contributory infringement has
increased with the emergence of new technologies, and as such,
use,” and “of the 116 opinions that found that factor four favored fair use, all but 6 found
fair use.”). But see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 715, 743–44 (2011) (arguing that based on empirical analysis of fair use cases from
2006-2010—cases decided after Beebe’s analysis—that an unequivocal transformative
use finding influences a finding of market harm).
117
Beebe, supra note 91, at 618.
118
See supra notes 102–106 and accompanying text; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510
U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
119
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (quoting 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, §
13.05).
120
Beebe, supra note 91, at 620.
121
See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 998
(2007); 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 841, § 12.04; see also Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
122
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971). See also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (citation omitted); see also WILLIAM PATRY,
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:47 (2007).
123
See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 841, § 12.04.
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outcomes tend to be highly fact-specific and difficult to apply neatly to subsequent conflicts.124
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, which this
Note discussed earlier in the context of fair use, the Supreme
Court applied contributory liability to copyright law for the first
time.125 There, copyright owners of television programs sued Sony,
the manufacturer of the Betamax, a video tape recording device
(“VTR”), because consumers used the technology to record
broadcasts.126 Betamax was cutting-edge technology, and by the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, VTRs had taken off and
the videocassette industry was emerging as an extremely lucrative
“content technology platform.”127 Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment, the Court absolved Sony of contributory infringement
liability because, although the recording technology was being used
to make unauthorized copies, the product was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”128
In A&M Records v. Napster,129 the Ninth Circuit held that Napster could be contributorily liable for its peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file
sharing service because it had actual and constructive knowledge of
infringement and provided the means for infringing.130 It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit imputed actual knowledge to
Napster on the basis of the company’s conduct and not the pro-

124

See Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.) (“A
typical, and typically unhelpful, definition . . . [b]ut does ‘may be held liable’ mean that a
person who fits the definition of ‘contributory infringer’ may nevertheless not be a
contributory infringer after all? And what exactly does ‘materially contribute’ mean? And
how does one materially contribute to something without causing or inducing it? And how
does ‘cause’ differ from ‘induce’?”).
See also PATRY, supra note 122, § 21:55 (“The rapidly evolving nature of technology and
the law in this important area militate against hard and fast rules and in favor of a
cautious, case-by-base approach.”).
125
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440–42 (1984).
126
See id. at 417.
127
Menell & Nimmer, supra note 121, at 954.
128
Id. at 442. Only 9% of the home tapings were authorized copies. Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 950–51 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
129
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). This was the
first case to consider secondary liability for P2P file sharing services. See id.
130
See id. at 1019–22.
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gram’s architecture.131 The finding of actual knowledge prevented
Napster from falling within the Sony safe harbor for technologies
that have substantial non-infringing uses.132 To arrive at its conclusion of actual knowledge, the Ninth Circuit examined the technical
aspects of Napster’s essential functions.133 Registered users could
share music with each other when they downloaded the program
onto their computers and subsequently uploaded their files to the
program’s “user library.”134 An individual user’s uploaded files
resided on her computer and were only available to other users
when she connected to Napster’s servers by logging in.135 Files
were not stored on Napster’s computers, but the program did rely
on a centralized database tracking which users were logged in and
connected users based on their search queries.136
The court, invoking Sony, vowed that it would not hold Napster liable merely because its program was capable of infringing
uses.137 Nevertheless, the court found Napster liable partially because it accepted the district court’s factual finding that Napster
had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement and that
it had the capability to block the infringing suppliers and did not do
so.138 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that gave
Napster the requisite knowledge of infringement, despite Napster’s arguments that it could not screen for infringing works
shared on its system.139 Regarding the inducement factor, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Napster clearly induced or caused third parties to directly infringe because “Napster users could not find and download the music they
want with the ease of which defendant boasts.”140
131

See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, § 12.04.
Napster, 239 F.3d. at 1020–22.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 1011–12.
135
Id. at 1012.
136
Id. at 1011–12.
137
Id. at 1020–21.
138
Id. at 1021–22. The court found actual knowledge because Napster had received
notices of infringement from the Recording Industry Association of America. Id. at 1020
and n.5.
139
Id. at 1022.
140
Id. at 1022 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919–
20 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
132
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Four years later, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster,
the Supreme Court declined to extend the Sony holding to a P2P
file-sharing service shown to have a clear objective of promoting
copyright infringement.141 The Court found Grokster liable under a
distinct variant of contributory infringement: the intentional inducement of infringement, which focuses on the alleged infringer’s
conduct rather than the nature of the technology.142 So, even
though the technology concededly was “capable of substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses,” Grokster’s intent to
use its technology to promote copyright invoked the liability under
the inducement theory.143
The Court also examined Grokster’s technology and practices
to find evidence of its intent to induce infringement.144 Grokster’s
P2P service had the capability to run even if Grokster was shut
down because it did not rely on a central database stored on its
servers.145 This was seen as an intentional move on Grokster’s part
in an attempt to avoid the Napster trap.146 Grokster also “voiced an
objective” to induce copyright infringement.147 Seeing Grokster as
a bad actor, the Court held that any product with a clear objective
of “promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement,”
and going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party
action “is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”148 Grokster’s intent to induce also helped the Court explicitly sidestep Sony by asserting that Sony never maintained that a
manufacturer of a product capable of substantially infringing uses
will never be liable for contributory copyright infringement.149

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
See id. at 936–37, 941.
Id. at 933–36.
Id. at 937–40.
Id. at 919–20.
Id. at 939.
See id. at 923–24.
Id. at 936–37.
Id. at 933–34.
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II. HYPERLINKING & NEWS STORIES IN
COPYRIGHT CASE LAW
Not all of the cases relevant to this Note’s central issue will
deal squarely with a party knowingly linking to infringing content.
It is imperative to also examine how courts treat linking in relation
to direct copyright infringement because proving both a direct infringement and an inducement to direct infringement are necessary
for proving contributory infringement. In Part II, this Note will discuss cases that face issues of hyperlinking intersecting with contributory infringement and direct infringement. It also discusses defenses that may have a chance to overcome a showing of infringement, which include the fair use defense as it pertains to hyperlinking and news stories.
A. Hyperlinking & Copyright Case Law
1. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.
In this case, the United States District Court for the District of
Utah granted a preliminary injunction upon finding defendant
could be held liable for contributory infringement for posting web
addresses to an unauthorized copy of a religious handbook.150 The
Utah Lighthouse Ministry operated a website criticizing The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.151 To prove contributory copyright infringement, Intellectual Reserve had to prove that
direct infringement occurred as a result of defendant’s posting particular links.152 Ultimately, the court found that a user clicking on
the link constitutes a direct infringement because a copy of this
work is subsequently being displayed on the user’s computer
150

Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290,
1294–95 (D. Utah 1999). The court never indicates that defendants actually provided
hyperlinks to an unauthorized copy of the Handbook, just that it posted the web
addresses. Some commentators have taken this to mean hyperlinking. See, e.g., Joseph P.
Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copyright Ownership, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1264–65 (2001). Others maintain that the site did not contain
a hyperlink, but that there is no legal distinction between providing a hyperlink and a web
address, which this Note agrees with. See Mary Anne Bendotoff, Intellectual Reserve, Inc.
v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.: Fair Use, the First Amendment, and the Freedom to Link,
35 U.S.F. L. REV. 83, 84 n.11 (2000).
151
Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
152
Id. at 1292.
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screen.153 In arriving at this conclusion, the court reasoned that,
“when a person browses a website, and by doing so displays the
Handbook, a copy of the Handbook is made in the computer’s random access memory (RAM), to permit viewing of the material.
And in making a copy, even a temporary one, the person who
browsed infringes the copyright.”154 This is an important case because the facts are closest to the issue at the heart of this Note: a
website knowingly posted the URLs (i.e., for the purposes of this
Note, hyperlinks) to infringing material.
2. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.
One of the first cases to comprehensively consider deep linking
in the context of copyright law, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com,
posited that deep linking itself cannot violate the Copyright Act
because no copying is involved.155 Both parties in the case sold tickets on the Internet.156 Ticketmaster’s business model relied on exclusive agreements with the events it sold tickets for. Tickets.com
also sold tickets, but had an additional feature informing users
“where and how tickets which it does not sell may be purchased.”157 When Ticketmaster had the exclusive license for selling tickets for a particular event, Tickets.com would provide a link
with the text, “Buy this ticket from another on-line ticketing company” and the user would be directed to an interior web page of
Ticketmaster.158 When it alleged copyright infringement, Ticketmaster argued that copying occurred “by transferring the event
page to [Tickets.com’s] own computer to facilitate extraction of
the facts.”159

153

Id. at 1294.
Id. (quoting Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir.
1993)).
155
See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000
WL 525390, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). The district court could not make a formal
ruling on the copyright claim because there was ambiguity as to whether Ticketmaster’s
event pages were covered in its copyright registration. See id.
156
Id. at *1.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at *2.
154
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The United States District Court for the Central District of
California rejected Ticketmaster’s argument.160 To support its argument, the court analogized clicking on hyperlinks to “using a
library’s card index to get reference to particular items, albeit faster
and more efficiently.”161 The court reasoned that Tickets.com
made it clear that users were being directed to Ticketmaster’s genuine website and that there was “no deception in what is happening.”162 This case is relevant because it demonstrates that when
there is no real bad actor and a website is generally perceived as
providing a good service, courts are more likely to find that hyperlinks are not capable of infringement.
3. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,163 the Ninth Circuit held that Arriba was not liable for copyright infringement for its use of thumbsize versions of copyrighted images as hyperlinks to deep link to
the photographer’s web page through its search engine because it
constituted fair use.164
In its fair use analysis, the court found the purpose and character of use weighed in favor of Arriba because the images were being
used to help users identify the images in the search engine, thus
creating a new purpose for the works that would increase the public’s access to them.165 The nature of the copyrighted work was in
Kelly’s favor because a creative work favors a finding of infringement.166 Consideration of the third factor turned was a draw.167

160

Id.
Id.
162
Id.
163
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
164
See id.
165
Id. at 820 (“The thumbnails do not stifle artistic creativity because they are not used
for illustrative or artistic purposes and therefore do not supplant the need for originals. In
addition, they benefit the public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the
internet.”).
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Id. (“Works that are creative in nature are closer to the core of intended copyright
protection than are more fact-based works. Photographs that are meant to be viewed by
the public for informative and aesthetic purposes, such as Kelly’s, are generally creative
in nature.” (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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One on hand, copying an entire work is a strike against you in the
fair use analysis.168 On the other hand, it is not dispositive, and this
factor can be neutral if one only uses the amount necessary for the
intended use.169 Lastly, the fourth factor weighed in favor of Arriba
because the thumbnails would bring more exposure to Kelly’s site
and spark interest in the full-size images.170
4. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.
Perfect 10171 is a landmark case because the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s adoption of the “Server Test,” thus rejecting the test adopted by the court in Intellectual Reserve.172 Additionally, the court held that while the images could infringe Perfect
10’s copyright, the hyperlinks themselves could not sustain a claim
of contributory copyright infringement.173 The primary reason for
this was the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the Server Test.174
Perfect 10, a company specializing in photographs of nude
women, sued Google and Amazon.com for contributory copyright
infringement for creating hyperlinks through thumbnail images that
were originally from an infringing third-party source. According to
an earlier case, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.175 a work
167

Id. at 821 (“This factor neither weighs for nor against either party because, although
Arriba did copy each of Kelly’s images as a whole, it was reasonable to do so in light of
Arriba’s use of the images.”).
168
See id.
169
See id.
170
Id. at 822 (“There would be no way to view, create, or sell a clear, full-sized image
without going to Kelly’s web sites. Therefore, Arriba’s creation and use of the thumbnails
does not harm the market for or value of Kelly’s images.”).
171
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)
172
See id. The Server Test says that a link constitutes a display for the purposes of
copyright infringement if it serves content over the web by “physically sending ones and
zeroes over the internet to the user’s browser.” Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp.
2d 828, 839 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. See also Perfect 10, 508
F.3d 1146.
173
See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1161–62.
174
See id.
175
MAI v. Peak considered whether or not the loading of a software program into a
computer’s RAM by a defendant computer technician constituted direct copyright
infringement. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). The
narrow holding as it applied to computer technicians was legislatively overruled by the
DMCA, which was amended after MAI to exempt third-party computer maintenance
companies to run copyrighted software (thus loading the program on the computer’s
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is “fixed” for the purposes of copyright when a digital copy is
stored in the RAM drive of the computer.176 Because links direct
you to the website, the Server Test asserts that users never actually
download the website and instead store it in their RAM drive.177
Thus, the user never downloaded a copy of an infringing work, so
there is no basis for direct infringement.178 And if there is no basis
for direct infringement, there is no basis for contributory infringement either.179
This ruling is directly at odds with Intellectual Reserve, where
the court concluded that when a web page displays on a user’s
computer, there is indeed a copy on the RAM and thus it is possible to create a copy through hyperlinking.180
B. Fair Use & News Stories
News stories are one of the favored uses enumerated in Section
107’s preamble.181 When news stories are the subject of a copyright
infringement suit, First Amendment values are also implicated.182
However, traditional First Amendment analysis usually is not directly applied in copyright cases because fair use is generally considered a “‘built-in’ safeguard in copyright law for mediating tensions between interests of copyright owners in controlling exploitations of their works and free speech.”183 One policy underlying
news stories as an enumerated favored use is the strong public interest in newsworthy information.184 Despite this policy, news stories are not categorically considered fair use, particularly when

RAM) on a computer in order to perform its maintenance duties. 17 U.S.C. § 117(c)
(2006); see also Liu, supra note 150, at 1261–62.
176
MAI Sys., 991 F.2d at 517–18.
177
See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160–61.
178
See id.
179
See id.
180
Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293–95
(D. Utah 1999).
181
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
182
See Samuelson, supra note 89.
183
See id. at 2546. Some commentators do not agree that the fair use doctrine
appropriately addresses First Amendment concerns. See id.
184
See id. at 2558–59.
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news stories take too much of the original work and when the news
organization “engaged in wrongful conduct.”185
In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme
Court found that a news article quoting approximately 300 words
from an unpublished manuscript was not fair use.186 After the conclusion of his term, President Gerald R. Ford contracted with Harper & Row and Reader’s Digest to publish a book of his memoirs,
including the exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts.187
The publishers then licensed the prepublication excerpts to Time
magazine, which scheduled an article covering the memoirs and
some of its excerpts for publication.188 Before the article was published, the editor of The Nation magazine obtained what he knew to
be an unauthorized copy of the manuscript and “hastily put together . . . ‘a real hot news story’” comprised of quotes, paraphrases, and facts drawn exclusively from the manuscript.189 In finding no fair use, the Court was particularly moved by The Nation’s
bad intent to “scoop” rival publication Time, especially in light of
the fact that the editor knew he obtained an unauthorized copy.190
The Court found that the third fair use factor weighed in favor of
the defendant because, despite being qualitatively insubstantial,
The Nation’s use was qualitatively substantial.191
III. FINDING FOR TARANTINO
Case law reflects the tenuous balance between protecting copyright holder’s property interests and protecting highly useful Internet innovations, like search engines.192 Court opinions are highly
fact-specific rulings heavily influenced by a policy of favoring In185
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See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 544–45, 569
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Id. at 542.
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ternet-based services. On one hand, Internet users and providers
need heightened protections in order to promote growth and innovation, so the Internet can realize its full potential. On the other
hand, the law must adequately protect copyright holders’ constitutional and statutory rights.
The touchstone for copyright law—“[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts”—is only so helpful when applied to
copyright issues arising from the Internet. What exactly will fulfill
that purpose? Surely giving certain Internet actors heightened protections fulfills copyright’s overarching purpose. After all, the relaxed rules have allowed enormously beneficial Internet-related
technologies to come to life. However, there is still a necessity to
incentivize creators. This Part argues that Gawker should be held
liable for inducement to infringe under the contributory copyright
liability strand of cases. This means that Gawker’s fair use defense
should not prevail.
As seen in Grokster and Harper & Row, the Supreme Court does
not like bad actors in the context of copyright infringement, directly using their unsavory purposes as a way to find liability. In light of
these decisions, Gawker is conceivably a bad actor in this scenario
because it solicited readers for a link to an unauthorized copy of the
script. The original story was that Tarantino’s script had been
leaked to the industry, not that it was leaked for the larger public to
view on the Internet. If this were the case, Gawker surely would
not have needed to solicit readers for a link to the site, it could have
just Googled the script. It then posted links to the web pages hosting the infringing copies, inviting its users to click on the links and
view the unauthorized copies.
A showing of inducement to infringe still requires a showing
that the direct infringement was a result of defendant’s inducement.193 Even though the fact that Gawker could not produce a link
to a script until after it had solicited its readers for the script raises
an eyebrow, it seems unlikely that Tarantino would be able to actually prove Gawker posted the script or that an anonymous user
posted the script as a result of Gawker’s solicitation. Thus, Tarantino would have to prove that clicking on hyperlink which then
193

See supra notes 141–48 and accompanying text.
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takes the user to a web page hosting infringing content constitutes
direct copyright infringement.194 In turn, to prove this, Tarantino
would have to prove that clicking on the hyperlink creates a copy.
As Carpenter and Hetcher argue, the “transitory duration”
prong of the fixation requirement is ill-suited to the digital age.195
Courts are literally nitpicking over seconds and technological
nuances to reach a finding over whether or not the display on a
computer is fixed enough for the purposes of copyright.196 The diversity in outcomes evidences that courts sense such displays
should constitute copies, but they are unable to find solid footing in
order to appease the transitory duration prong. This Note agrees
with Carpenter and Hetcher that the transitory duration prong
should not be a part of the fixation requirement and, under this assertion, argues that image on a computer screen is a fixed display
for the purposes of copyright law.
The concern that arises out of such an argument is that nearly
everyone would effectively be committing copyright infringement
every day and it would be impossible to police. However, the legislature could effectively cabin liability under such copying to intentional secondary liability claims that cannot prevail on a fair use
defense. Cabining liability would also maintain the basic structure
of the World Wide Web, which depends on linking.
Gawker’s provision of links should not qualify as fair use merely because those links are housed in a news story. In the instant
case, besides the favored fair use of Gawker’s news story, all four
factors should lean toward Tarantino. As Beebe’s data suggested,
the fair use analysis seems to come down to a “two-sided balancing
test in which [courts] weigh the strength of the defendant’s justification for its use, as that justification has been developed in the
first three factors, against the impact of that use on the incentives
of the plaintiff[s],” with the fourth factor being the most determinative of the outcome.197 Although Tarantino changed his mind and
decided to go ahead with filming, suggesting there was not much
market harm to him, this was uncertain at the time of the case.
194
195
196
197

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58–69 and accompanying text.
See Carpenter & Hetcher, supra note 58, at 2253–55.
Beebe, supra note 91, at 621.
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Gawker might be able to successfully argue that Tarantino is actually better off as a result of the leak due to the free publicity and
his fervent fan base. However, not all screenwriters will be so
lucky, and it would be a dangerous game for courts to instill
precedent of predicting the likelihood of market harm based on the
perceived popularity of a given screenwriter. Furthermore, allowing Gawker’s actions, while in the short term supporting copyright
law’s goal of disseminating works to the public, may ultimately inhibit this goal as screenwriters or studios refuse to produce movies
because of an increase in this practice.
Additionally, as seen in Harper & Row, courts generally are not
fond of bad actors, and in the instant case, Gawker actively solicited readers to produce a copy of the script that the site could link
to. Again, it seems unlikely that Gawker would solicit readers unless there was no public copy online to begin with. Assuming this,
Gawker seemed to actually create the news story of the leak on the
Internet. That is, Gawker should not prevail on the claim that
hyperlinking to the news story was an essential part in validating its
news story because the original news story was presumably not an
Internet leak. Moreover, even if a court did find that linking to a
case was not a bad act because it helped Gawker validate its story,
publishing the whole script pushes back. Under fair use, Gawker is
fully entitled to publish excerpts of The Hateful Eight so long as
those excerpts are qualitatively substantial—a difficult task when it
is a Tarantino screenplay. Posting links to the entire screenplay is
unnecessary for its purpose as a news story.
CONCLUSION
Gawker should be held liable for knowingly linking to a web
page hosting unauthorized copies of Tarantino’s Hateful Eight
screenplay. This argument rests primarily on the suggestion that
the transitory duration prong of the fixation requirement should be
relegated to a footnote in copyright’s history. Accordingly, displaying a web page on a computer should be considered a copy for the
purposes of copyright liability, although liability for infringement
should only be annexed to actors that knowingly induce others to
view the infringing material. Furthermore, Gawker should not pre-
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vail on a fair use defense, because of the harm to the potential market, it’s bad intent, and the fact that it unnecessarily linked to a full
copy of the work when it at most needed to publish excerpts.

